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FINLEY v. UNITED STATES. PENDENT PARTY
JURISDICTION UNDER THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT
All issues of federal subject matter jurisdiction command two levels of
analysis: constitutional and statutory.' Article III of the United States Con-
stitution extends the judicial power of the United States to "cases" and "con-
troversies." 2 Furthermore, the Constitution requires that the judicial power
of all federal courts inferior to the United States Supreme Court be estab-
lished by Congress.3 Therefore, in order for a matter to be heard in federal
court, it must amount to a "case" or "controversy" under article III of the
Constitution4 and comply with jurisdictional statutes set by Congress.
1. See Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (1989) (quoting Mayor v. Cooper,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868)).
2. Article III provides:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish....
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controver-
sies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-
between Citizens of different States,-between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2; see infra text accompanying notes 32-35.
Under the Constitution, "cases" and "controversies" are nearly synonymous. See Aetna
Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937). See generally NOWAK, ROTUNDA,
& YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.12, at 55 (1986) (citing Aetna). But cf L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-7 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968)
that "[e]mbodied in the words 'cases' and 'controversies' are two complementary but some-
what different limitations").
Additionally, Justice Stevens argued that the term "civil action" as used in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure has the same reference as "case." Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
2003, 2014, 2018-19 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 724 (1966)); see FED. R. CIv. P. 2, infra note 147. According to Professor Freer,
"the scope of the civil action is coextensive with the scope of the constitutional 'case.'" Freer,
A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 DUKE L.J. 34, 58.
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173
(1803).
4. This Note shall refer to a legal action conforming to constitutional constraints as a
"constitutional case" or simply as a "case." Generally, the concept of case involves the doc-
trine of justiciability. In order for a civil action to be justiciable in the federal courts as a
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Under the judge-made doctrine of pendent jurisdiction,5 a plaintiff suing in
federal court may join a nonfederal6 action provided the two actions amount
to a single constitutional case7 and the anchor claim is within the statutory
jurisdiction of the court.'
The United States Supreme Court first alluded to the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction in the early 1820's,9 indicating that the Constitution empowers
the federal courts to resolve nonfederal matters which are naturally incident
to the legitimate exercise of federal judicial power.." Over one hundred
years later, the Supreme Court gave the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction con-
stitutional force.II Specifically, the Court stated that as long as two claims
"derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" they comprise "one con-
stitutional 'case.' "12 Thus, once a "case," the actions are justiciable in the
federal courts. Since this landmark decision, the Supreme Court has greatly
narrowed the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Most importantly, the Court
circumscribed the application of the doctrine in situations in which the
plaintiff seeks to join pendent parties.13 The Court held that "the addition of
a completely new party would run counter to the well-established principle
that federal courts ...are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by
Congress."14
In Finley v. United States, 15 the United States Supreme Court confronted
the "subtle and complex" 16 issue of whether a plaintiff suing the United
States Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)"7 may join
additional state parties according to the theory of pendent party jurisdiction.
A similar issue arose in a prior Supreme Court decision, which held that acts
"case" the plaintiff must have standing to sue and the issue must be ripe and not moot. See
infra note 33 and accompanying text.
5. Pendent jurisdiction is so called because a litigant, usually the plaintiff, appends an
action lacking federal statutory jurisdiction to one which possesses sufficient federal jurisdic-
tion. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.12, at
65-66 (1985) [hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL].
6. The term "nonfederal" is used to denote a lack of federal statutory jurisdiction.
7. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
8. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
9. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822-23 (1824).
10. Id.
11. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715.
12. Id. at 725.
13. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). Note that the Court spoke of pendent parties
and not pendent claims. See infra notes 40-69 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 79-
86.
14. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 15.
15. 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
16. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715 (1973).
17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1982).
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of Congress which confer special grants of jurisdiction may be found to ex-
clude certain defendants."8 Thus, Supreme Court precedent established that
such virtues as judicial economy and fairness will have to yield to statutory
jurisdictional requirements. In Finley, the Supreme Court continued its
trend of narrowing the pendent party doctrine.
The Finley case arose as a result of a plane crash at a San Diego airfield. 9
The plaintiff, Barbara Finley, a California resident, brought suit in Califor-
nia state court against the city of San Diego for negligently maintaining the
airfield's runway lights, and against the San Diego Gas & Electric Company
for negligent placement of the power lines with which the aircraft collided.2'
The plaintiff also brought suit in United States District Court against the
United States for negligence on the part of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) in the maintenance of the airfield.2
Approximately one year after filing her complaints, Finley moved to
amend her complaint against the United States in order to join the state
defendants.22 Thus, the issue arose as to whether Finley could, under the
law, join additional parties over whom there was no independent source of
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Despite consistent Ninth Circuit disap-
proval of pendent party jurisdiction,23 the district judge allowed the state
parties to be joined in Finley's federal action for reasons of judicial economy
and efficiency.24 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
subsequently reversed the district court's decision.25
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari26 to hear the case,
and affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding.27 The Supreme Court stated that
because the FTCA does not extend federal jurisdiction to any party other
18. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16-17 (holding that if it can be found that Congress has
excluded a party from liability under a particular jurisdictional statute, that party is not sub-
ject to the court's jurisdiction under that statute); see also infra notes 79-86 and accompanying
text.




23. Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982
(1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Moor v.
Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969); Wil-
liams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1969); see infra notes 157-64 and accompanying
text.
24. Petition for Certiorari, Appendix A at A-8, 9, Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003
(1989) (No. 87-1973) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari].
25. Id. at A-2; see also Finley, 109 S.Ct. at 2005.
26. Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988).
27. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2010.
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than the United States, nonfederal parties may not be appended as defend-
ants in tort actions against the United States.2" The dissent, however, ar-
gued that, based on Supreme Court precedent, Finley should be able to join
nonfederal parties because the federal and state claims arose out of a com-
mon nucleus of operative fact and, thus, amounted to a constitutional case.29
Further, the dissent reasoned that, because the FTCA requires that tort ac-
tions against the United States be brought in federal court, fairness and judi-
cial economy mandate that the plaintiff not be forced to sue other parties in
state court.3°
This Note discusses the unstable doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction, its
roots and its uncertain future. First, the Note discusses the forms of supple-
mental jurisdiction and the federal courts' application of such jurisdiction.
Next, it analyzes the jurisdictional requirement of the FTCA and compares
the FTCA to other sources of federal jurisdiction. This Note then examines
the Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opinions in Finley v. United
States. This Note explains Finley's effect on the law of pendent party juris-
diction as well as its impact on the construction of the FTCA's jurisdictional
grant. This Note concludes that while Finley may appear narrow in its rea-
soning, it is consistent with the Court's prior decisions. Moreover, although
Finley v. United States is a blow to the pendent party doctrine's already
"wobbly"'" foundation, future interpretations of the doctrine should limit
Finley to FTCA litigation.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Article III of the United States Constitution permits the federal courts to
hear "cases" and "controversies."" Whether something is a "case" is a ba-
sic constitutional question that must be answered in the affirmative before
any suit may proceed in federal court. By "case" or "controversy," article
III requires that the case be justiciable.33 That is, there must be a genuine
28. Id at 2008.
29. Id. at 2011 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)); see supra note 2.
30. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2015 n.15 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
31. Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1359 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner,
J., separate opinion).
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see supra note 2.
33. One of the requirements of justiciability is that the litigant have standing. "In essence
the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of
the dispute or of particular issues." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of
federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another
person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more
appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a
[Vol. 39:859
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issue regarding some right created by the Constitution or laws of the United
States that will be affected if the Constitution or law is interpreted in a par-
ticular manner.34 Once deemed a "case," there also must be valid subject
matter jurisdiction.35
Supplemental jurisdiction, which augments otherwise jurisdictionally in-
sufficient actions, is jurisdiction derived from the Constitution and principles
of judicial economy.36 That is, actions which amount to a case under the
Constitution but lack any statutory jurisdictional basis must rely on supple-
mental jurisdiction to supply the second jurisdictional prong required by arti-
cle III."
There are two forms of supplemental jurisdiction: ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction. 3' Ancillary jurisdiction is essentially a defendant's device
which allows the defendant to join related state claims or parties over which
the federal courts have no statutory jurisdiction to a federal action. Plain-
tiffs primarily utilize pendent jurisdiction in a similar manner, to join
nonfederal parties or claims to a federal action.39 Within each form of sup-
plemental jursidiction there are two levels on which jurisdiction is supplied:
claims and parties.
plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.
The requirement of standing, however, has a core component derived directly from
the Constitution. A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the de-
fendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested
relief.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982)). Additionally,
justiciability requires that the claim be ripe for adjudication and not moot. See, e.g., United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1946) (stating that hypothetical cases are
unripe for adjudication); see also, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41
(1937) (stating that a moot case is not justiciable); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)
(stating the exception that cases which are "capable of repetition, yet evading review" will
overcome mootness (citations omitted)).
34. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936).
35. See Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868) (stating that a federal court's
jurisdiction must be both constitutionally and statutorily granted).
36. For an argument that supplemental jurisdiction is rooted in federal jurisdictional stat-
utes, see Freer, supra note 2.
37. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1; see supra note 2.
38. There is no substantial legal difference between the ancillary and pendent jurisdiction.
See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5, § 2.12, at 66; see also Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitu-
tional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdic-
tion, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1401, 1401 n. 1 (1983); Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 26
S. TEX. L.J. 1 (1985); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of
Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263 (1975).
39. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5, § 2.12, at 66; see, e.g., United States ex rel Small
Business Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (in a suit brought by SBA, the defendant
was permitted to implead a third party defendant under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction).
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A. Pendent Claim Jurisdiction
Pendent claims meet the article III requirement that there be statutory
jurisdiction over the entire case because they "derive from a common nu-
cleus of operative fact" with substantial federal claims.' This requirement
is driven primarily by a desire to promote public policy and judicial econ-
omy.41 Streamlining civil actions produces efficiency and prevents inconve-
nient and costly duplicative litigation.42
The two essential elements in a court's determination to extend pendent
jurisdiction are a sufficient factual overlap between the state and federal ac-
tions and the existence of a substantial federal question. The factual similar-
ity between the state and federal actions allows a federal court to treat them
as a single constitutional case. Absent such an overlap, any additional
nonfederal claims must be brought in state court. The second element a
federal court must consider is statutory in nature.
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,43 the United States Supreme Court es-
tablished the test for the joinder of state claims in federal actions. Gibbs
arose out of a labor dispute between the United Mine Workers of America
(UMW) and the Southern Labor Union." In 1960, the Tennessee Consoli-
dated Coal Company closed one of its mines in southern Tennessee, thereby
laying off one hundred miners belonging to the UMW's local union.45 The
respondent, Paul Gibbs, was hired by the Grundy Company, a subsidiary of
Consolidated, as a superintendent at a new mine on Consolidated's prop-
erty.46 Angry about not being hired to work in the new mine, the local
union forcibly stopped the mine from opening, threatened Gibbs, and beat a
rival labor organizer.47 As a result of this conflict, the mine did not open,
and Gibbs lost his employment position with Grundy.4
40. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The issue in Gibbs was
whether two actions make up a "case." There was no issue of statutory construction.
41. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
42. See id. (explaining that the justification for pendent jurisdiction rests in principles "of
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants"). Moreover, it is a well known princi-
ple that procedures that increase judicial economy and decrease waste are favored over those
that merely administer justice without regard to economy. See Posner, An Economic Approach
to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 435 (1973) (mention-
ing, for example, collateral estoppel as a procedural device designed to reduce the expense of
litigation).
43. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
44. Id at 717-722; see also Gibbs v. United Mine Workers, 343 F.2d 609, 610-614 (6th
Cir. 1965); Gibbs v. United Mine Workers, 220 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
45. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 718.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 720.
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In August 1961, Gibbs brought suit against the UMW in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee.49 Gibbs based
jurisdiction on the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act,5° alleg-
ing that the union's actions resulted in a secondary boycott prohibited by the
Act. Gibbs also brought state claims against the UMW for unlawful con-
spiracy and boycott aimed at tortiously interfering with his employment.
The jury found in favor of the plaintiff Gibbs and awarded him a total of
$174,500.51 However, the district court only granted damages after Gibbs
accepted an $85,000 remittitur of the jury's award.5 2 Additionally, the dis-
trict court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the common law claims
under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.53
Both the UMW and Gibbs appealed the district court decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.54 The court of appeals
affirmed" the lower court's substantive rulings and agreed that the jury
could consider the same facts in its determinations of the plaintiff's federal
and state common law claims.
56
On the petition by UMW, the Supreme Court granted certiorari57 and
reversed the court of appeals5" on the substantive law,59 but agreed with the
lower courts on the issue of federal jurisdiction.' The Supreme Court, how-
ever, abandoned its prior test6 1 and substituted a new two tier test for pen-
49. Gibbs v. United Mine Workers, 220 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
50. Id. at 873; Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187
(1982).
51. Gibbs, 220 F. Supp. at 873.
52. Id. at 880.
53. Id. at 879 (citing Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1933) (holding that state law
claims may be heard in federal court provided they call for a "separate and distinct" ground
for relief while making up a single cause of action with a substantial federal claim)).
54. Gibbs v. United Mine Workers, 343 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1965).
55. Id. at 618.
56. Id at 614-15.
57. 382 U.S. 809 (1965).
58. 383 U.S. 715, 742 (1966).
59. The Court explained that there was a special proof requirement imposed by section 6
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 735. The Court
concluded that "the crucial fact of [the UMW's] participation in or ratification of the violence
that occurred was not proved to the degree of certainty required by § 6 [of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act]." Id at 742.
60. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 728-29 (stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
hearing the state claim).
61. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); see also supra note 53. Hum was decided
before the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Thus, in light of this
change, the Court reasoned that a new rule of pendent jurisdiction was needed to reflect the
meaning of the Federal Rules' use of "civil action" and to help dispel problems associated with
the vague term "cause of action." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 722-24 (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 2); see
infra note 147.
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dent jurisdiction. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that in order for a
nonfederal claim to be appended to a federal claim, the federal claim must be
"substantial" '62 and both "claims must derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact."63 The Court further explained that whether pendent juris-
diction will exist lies entirely in the discretion of the trial court."4 The Court
found that the justification for pendent jurisdiction "lies in considerations of
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants."'65
B. Pendent Party Jurisdiction
On the "party" level, pendent jurisdiction arises when the plaintiff seeks to
join additional, nonfederal, parties to an action against the original defend-
ant in federal court.66 Unlike appending claims, plaintiffs face difficulty
when attempting to utilize pendent jurisdiction to join nonfederal parties.
Generally, opposition to the joinder of pendent parties is supported by the
lack of the necessary statutory jurisdiction required of all parties in the fed-
eral courts.67 The mere fact that there is a substantial factual overlap be-
tween actions against party A and party B may not be enough for a federal
court to waive the requirement that there be statutory jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, when a plaintiff seeks to add a party over whom there is no federal
question, diversity, or special jurisdiction, the case against the additional
party is not justiciable unless the court will permit the party to be joined
according to the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction. However, the party
in question may be excluded from the jurisdictional grant under the particu-
lar statute. 68 Thus, the fact that actions against multiple parties are part of
one constitutional case may be immaterial in light of a statute excluding the
additional parties. This jurisdictional tenet derives from the fact that the
supplemental jurisdiction is only as inclusive as the original, or "anchor,"
jurisdiction. That is, if a jurisdictional statute requires all parties to have a
sufficient amount in controversy, the statute necessarily restricts the joinder
of pendent parties to those that meet the requirement.
69
62. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 722 (employing the rule of Hurn, 289 U.S. at 243-46). For a discus-
sion of the doctrine of substantiality, see infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
63. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
64. Id. at 726.
65. Id.
66. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5, § 2.12, at 66.
67. See Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (1989).
68. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
69. See Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); see also infra notes 92-99 and ac-
companying text.
The restriction on joining pendent parties, however, is relaxed for defendants who must
countersue the plaintiff or implead nonfederal third parties. Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a "pleader," who has a compulsory counterclaim against an opposing party, must
[Vol. 39:859
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C. The Statutory Basis Limiting Pendent Party Jurisdiction
Federal subject matter jurisdiction is required for the federal courts to
hear a case.7 ° Sections 1331 and 1332 of the Federal Judicial Code71 state
that the federal courts have jurisdiction over two types of civil actions: (1)
those which present federal questions; and (2) those in which the litigants
are diverse citizens having an amount in controversy exceeding $50,000.72
In addition, the code provides special jurisdictional statutes that explicitly
grant federal jurisdiction in such areas as antitrust suits,7 3 civil rights
cases, 74 and claims against the United States.75  Thus, all federal subject
matter jurisdiction fits into three statutory categories: Federal question, di-
versity, and special.
state the claim in the appropriate pleading or waive the claim. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors,
Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974). Federal jurisdiction for nonfederal compulsory counter-
claims automatically exists because such claims are, by definition, ancillary to the main claim.
Iii; see also Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1979).
Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines "compulsory counterclaim" as a claim
"aris[ing] out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Because ancillarity, for jurisdictional purposes, is simi-
larly defined, federal jurisdiction will lie for compulsory counterclaims. See Moore v. New
York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co.,
286 F.2d 631, 633 (1961). Ancillary jurisdiction, however, will not lie for permissive counter-
claims because such claims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the main
claim. Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 426 F.2d 709, 714 (5th
Cir. 1970).
Parties impleaded pursuant to Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure obtain ancil-
lary jurisdiction in a similar manner as nonfederal compulsory counterclaims. F&D, Inc. v.
O'Hara & Kendall Aviation, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 44, 45 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ("[A] defendant's
nonfederal claim against a nondiverse third party defendant is within the ancillary jurisdiction
of a federal court."); see Revere Copper & Brass, 426 F.2d at 715. Generally, only defendants
implead third parties. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Rule 14(b), however, permits plaintiffs to im-
plead third parties after they have been countersued, thus putting plaintiffs in the position of a
defendant. Id. 14(b); see FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5, § 6.9, at 360-65. But cf Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (ancillary party jurisdiction was denied over a
nondiverse impleaded party in a diversity suit after the main defendant was dismissed); see
infra notes 100-17 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
71. The Judicial Code comprises title 28 of the United States Code which concerns the
organization, jurisdiction, venue, and procedures of the federal court system.
72. In 1988, Congress increased the minimum amount in controversy requirement of the
diversity statute from $10,000 to $50,000. Diversity of Citizenship, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102
Stat. 4646 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988)).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982).
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In addition, grants of special federal question jurisdiction fall into two
subcategories: Exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction.76 Tort claims against
the United States must be brought in United States District Court while
contract claims against the United States exceeding $10,000 must be brought
in United States Claims Court." In each of the above instances, jurisdiction
is exclusive. For contract suits less than $10,000, jurisdiction is concur-
rent."' Namely, such suits may be brought either in the United States
Claims Court or the United States District Court.
Additionally, in diversity actions jurisdiction is concurrent because diver-
sity actions are actually state claims that are litigated in federal court by
virtue of the amount in controversy and the diversity of the parties' citizen-
ship. Therefore, both state and federal courts have jurisdiction over such
claims.
1. Federal Question Jurisdiction
In Aldinger v. Howard,"9 the Supreme Court narrowed the Gibbs doctrine
by holding that pendent parties must not only present a constitutional case
but also survive statutory scrutiny in order to lie within the pendent jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts.80 In Aldinger, the plaintiff, Monica Aldinger,
charged the county of Spokane, Washington and the county treasurer with
violating her civil rights and with other state law claims."1 Aldinger brought
the action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington, asserting jurisdiction under the federal civil rights statute.
8 2
76. For example, the FTCA grants exclusive jurisdiction to the district courts. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b); see infra note 252 and accompanying text. For a discussion of exclusive and con-
current jurisdiction, see 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3527, at 245 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter WRIGHT].
77. Section 1346(a)(2) bestows concurrent jurisdiction on the district courts and claims
court for Tucker Act suits with amounts in controversy under $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)
requires that suits for more than $10,000 be brought in the claims court. United States v.
Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 72 (1987). Private parties are not permitted to be defendants in the claims
court. Hopkins v. United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 303, 513 F. 2d 1360 (Ct. CI. 1975), aff'd in part
and vacated in part on other grounds, 427 U.S. 123 (1976); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1509 (1982).
The FTCA, however, provides that only the district courts may be the forum for FTCA ac-
tions against the government.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982).
79. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
80. Id. at 16-19.
81. Id. at 2-5.
82. Id. at 3-4. The statute provides that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person:
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Con-
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The Supreme Court found that, even though the federal civil rights suit and
the state law claims against the county and its treasurer arose from a com-
mon nucleus of operative fact, thereby comprising a case under article III,
the district court lacked the judicial power to hear the state law suit against
the county because Congress excluded counties from liability under the Civil
Rights Act. 3 Thus, the Court determined that the federal jurisdiction
granted under the Civil Rights Act could not supply pendent jurisdiction in
the absence of statutory jurisdiction because the Civil Rights Act, by impli-
cation, did not extend its jurisdiction to counties.8 4 The Court stated that
when Congress has circumscribed federal jurisdiction within a particular
statute, the plaintiff is limited to the exact language of the statute and to any
valid congressional requirements present in the legislative history. 5 There-
fore, the Court determined that the "[r]esolution of a claim of pendent-party
jurisdiction . . . calls for careful attention to the relevant statutory
language."
86
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued strongly in favor of extending the
Gibbs standards to pendent parties.8 7 Relying on the language of Gibbs, Jus-
stitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States....
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982); see infra note 127 (Aldinger's applicability to federal question
cases).
83. Aldinger, 427 U.S, at 16-17. The Civil Rights Act provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (emphasis added).
Although Aldinger tried, she could not sue Spokane County because the county was not
deemed to be a "person" under the statute and, therefore, was not liable under the Civil Rights
Act. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16. In Aldinger, the Supreme Court relied on Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), rev'd, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), to make its finding that, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the county was not a "person." Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16. The Court has since overruled
Monroe's interpretation of section 1983 in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). This reversal, however, does not affect Aldinger's underlying principle
that there must be both constitutional and statutory power for the federal courts to have juris-
diction over a case or controversy and that Congress can exclude particular parties from a
statute's jurisdiction. In Monell, the Court merely recanted its former reading of "person"
under the Civil Rights Act. Monell, 436 U.S. at 664-65.
84. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16.
85. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18. Writing for the majority in Aldinger, Justice Rehnquist held
that, "[b]efore it can be concluded that [pendent party] jurisdiction exists, a federal court must
satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but that Congress in the statutes conferring
jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its existence." Id.
86. Id at 17.
87. Id. at 34-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tice Brennan warned against stressing the claim or party aspect of the state
action, but instead urged the Court to focus on whether the state and federal
actions would ordinarily be expected to be tried together."8 Justice Bren-
nan's dissent noted that the constitutional issue of pendent jurisdiction con-
cerns only the subject matter, not the "in personam" jurisdiction of the
federal courts.8 9
In both the Court's majority opinion in Gibbs and the dissent in Aldinger,
Justice Brennan argued in favor of giving the constitutional, rather than the
statutory, aspect of jurisdiction more weight.' ° Justice Brennan maintained
that when there is a clear factual overlap and no plain statutory barrier to
prevent additional actions from being heard in federal court, courts should
be free to join the actions in one proceeding. 9 When jurisdiction is based
upon diversity, the Supreme Court has further limited pendent party
jurisdiction.
2. Diversity Jurisdiction
In Zahn v. International Paper Co.,92 four owners of Vermont lakefront
property brought a class action on behalf of themselves and two hundred
other lakefront property owners against International Paper Company, a
New York corporation, for polluting the waters of the lake with discharges
from the paper plant. 93 The property owners asserted jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), 94 the diversity statute. However, only the four main
plaintiffs could show damages in excess of the statutory minimum of
88. "'[I]f, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims
are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then,
assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the
whole.'" Id. at 19 (majority opinion) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725-26 (1966)) (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id. at 20-21; Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
91. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 23-25, 35-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. But cf infra note 116 and accompanying text
(White, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of joining ancillary parties).
93. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 291-92.
94. Section 1332 contains strict in personam restrictions. It provides that:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum of or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state .... as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
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$10,000. 9- Thus, under the rule that all parties to a class action based upon
diversity of citizenship have a claim satisfying the statutory amount in con-
troversy requirement,96 the suit was not permitted to proceed as a class ac-
tion.97 In Zahn, all the plaintiffs' claims amounted to a constitutional
case, 98 but the Court refused to allow any one plaintiff to "ride in on an-
other's coattails"99 because of the statutory jurisdictional defect.
In Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, " a citizen of Iowa sued the
Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), a Nebraska corporation, alleging
that OPPD caused the wrongful death of her husband."°1 The plaintiff,
Kroger, asserted jurisdiction under the federal diversity statute.102 The de-
fendant, OPPD, then impleaded Owen Equipment according to the doctrine
of ancillary jurisdiction. 10 3 The court thereafter granted Kroger leave to
amend her complaint.'°4 In her amended complaint, Kroger named Owen,
an Iowa corporation, which she incorrectly alleged was a Nebraska
corporation.' 05
When the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of OPPD, °6
Kroger's only remaining action was against Owen, a nondiverse party. The
district court, in a memorandum opinion, found that it had jurisdiction over
the nondiverse party despite the absence of any independent jurisdictional
basis."17 The district court reasoned that United Mine Workers v. Gibbs"08
granted the federal courts discretion in cases to exercise judicial power over
pendent parties. 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
Diversity of Citizenship, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4646 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988) (the amendment substituted $50,000 for the $10,000 minimum
amount in controversy requirement)).
95. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 292; see supra note 72.
96. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
97. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the "class [be] so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable... " FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a).
98. See Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (1989) (citing Zahn, 414 U.S. 291).
99. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301.
100. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
101. Id. at 367-68.
102. Diversity of Citizenship, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4646 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988)); see supra note 94.
103. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 374-75; see supra text accompanying notes 38-39 (ancillary juris-
diction); see also supra note 69 (impleader).





108. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
109. See Kroger, 558 F.2d at 419.
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cuit affirmed"' the trial court, stating that the "[d]istrict [c]ourt's retention
of jurisdiction in the case at bar is clearly outlined in Gibbs."111 The court of
appeals found that, because the claims against OPPD and Owen arose from
a common nucleus of operative facts, an unfair result would follow if the
court denied jurisdiction. Thus, the court held that it was proper for the
district court to exercise its discretion to permit Kroger to pursue her case
against a nondiverse party in federal court. 1 2 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari 1 3 and reversed the court of appeals' decision. 114 The Supreme
Court held that in order for the plaintiff to remain in federal court, she
would have to be diverse with Owen or sue pursuant to a federal law." 5
Because Kroger could not meet either requirement, the Court dismissed the
case against Owen for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In dissent, Justice White disagreed with the majority's approach." 6 Jus-
tice White stressed that Kroger was a plaintiff who asserted a claim against a
third-party defendant and, most importantly, did not seek to add a new
party.117 Moreover, because Kroger did not initiate the proceedings against
Owen, she should not be penalized."' Thus, the dissent agreed with the
court of appeals that, in Kroger's case, virtues of fairness and judicial econ-
omy should receive greater consideration than they would if she had initi-
ated proceedings against the nonfederal party." 9
3. Special Federal Jurisdiction
In suits brought pursuant to federal statutes which grant jurisdiction in-
dependent of the federal question or diversity statutes, the same general prin-
ciples of statutory construction apply. 120  The requirements remain that
statutory jurisdiction be present and that any and all prescribed limitations
on such jurisdiction be enforced.
In United States v. Sherwood, 2' in order to obtain complete relief, a judg-
ment creditor, Sherwood, sued the United States and a judgment debtor
110. See id. at 428.
111. Id. at 424.
112. Id. at 427.
113. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
114. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978).
115. Id. at 373-77.
116. Id. at 377 (White, J., dissenting); see supra note 92.
117. Id. at 381; see FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (explaining that "third party defendants" are
those impleaded by a named defendant).
118. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 381.
119. See id. at 382.
120. Finley v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 2007-09 (1989) (discussing Aldinger, Zahn,
and Kroger and their application to the FTCA, a grant of special jurisdiction).
121. 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
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under the Tucker Act 122 in United States District Court for damages result-
ing from a breach of contract. The New York Supreme Court, acting pursu-
ant to section 795 of the New York Civil Practice Act, authorized the
suit. 2 3 The United States Supreme Court reversed the state court ruling on
the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction as to the private party,
the judgment debtor. 124 In Sherwood, the Court decided that when a waiver
of sovereign immunity provides for federal jurisdiction in suits brought
against the government, any interpretation of the statute expanding that ju-
risdiction violates the doctrine that waivers of sovereign immunity be strictly
construed.1 25
II. JURISDICTION UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted pendent party jurisdic-
tion in three jurisdictional contexts. 126 For purposes of interpreting pendent
party jurisdiction under the FTCA, however, diversity jurisdiction is the
most useful guidepost.
The FTCA and the Tucker Act are both statutes, waiving sovereign im-
munity, which permit plaintiffs to bring what would otherwise be a state
variety tort or contract action against the Federal Government. Thus, like
the diversity statute, these acts involve nonfederal suits in a federal court.
The main differences between these waivers of sovereign immunity and the
diversity statute are merely procedural. That is, although the FTCA and the
Tucker Act provide for an exclusive federal forum, there is no substantive
difference in the type of tort or contract claims brought under these statutes
and the diversity statute. There are also other special jurisdictional grants,
however, which provide for federal jurisdiction such as in civil rights and
antitrust suits. 127 In these other special jurisdictional cases, substantial fed-
eral law is involved because the right of legal action derives from the United
States Constitution and federal laws. In contrast, aside from the fact that
the Tucker Act and the FTCA involve waivers of sovereign immunity, such
cases raise no substantial federal issues.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982); see supra note 77 (discussing the Tucker Act).
123. Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 585-86 (Section 795(g) of the New York Civil Practice Act
makes a judgment debtor a necessary party).
124. Id. at 588.
125. Id. at 590-91.
126. The three types of pendent party jurisdiction are federal question, diversity, and spe-
cial federal.
127. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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A. Substantiality and Sovereign Immunity
1. Substantiality
In FTCA cases, federal jurisdiction does not exist because there is a sub-
stantial, nonfrivolous claim arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States. Rather, federal jurisdiction is predicated on the fact that the
sovereign, in its waiver of immunity from suit, chose the federal court sys-
tem as the exclusive forum for tort actions against it: not because there is
some substantial federal interest at stake. Thus, the notion of "substantial-
ity" has two meanings.
First, traditional substantiality relates to the well-pleaded complaint
rule128 in that an utterly frivolous claim is not sufficiently substantial for
disposition in the federal courts.129 The purpose of this rule is to prevent
litigants from overburdening the federal court system with frivolous legal
actions.
In the second instance, substantiality relates to whether a claim, which is
nonfrivolous, is substantially federal in character. Claims which arise under
the Constitution and laws of the United States are, by definition, substan-
tially federal. 3° Claims based on state or common law, however, are not
substantially federal because they involve no federal issue. For example,
when federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, there is no sub-
stantial federal issue at stake because the plaintiff's cause of action stems
from a principle of state or common law. 31 Federal diversity jurisdiction is
merely a way of hearing in federal court cases in which the parties are of
diverse citizenship and have an amount in controversy in excess of
$50,000. 132
It is imperative that, when pendent jurisdiction is exercised in diversity
situations, the amount in controversy and diversity of citizenship between
the parties be sufficient. In matters where the legal issues are nonfederal,
pendent jurisdiction is at its weakest because the slightest statutory defect
may render aspects of the case unfit for federal adjudication. In federal
question cases, however, no in personam requirements exist. Therefore, the
constitutional issues of pendent jurisdiction predominate.
133
128. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1974) (discussing the substantiality doctrine
under the Constitution); see FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5, § 2.4, at 21-24.
129. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5, § 2.4, at 24.
130. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; supra note 2.
131. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (stating that in diversity actions
substantive state law applies).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988); see supra note 94.
133. Note that when Congress supplies special jurisdiction over what is otherwise a federal
question, as in civil rights cases, any implied or express in personam requirements in the juris-
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The FTCA is similar to the diversity statute because it allows litigants to
bring what would otherwise be state and common law tort claims in federal
court. The substance of FTCA actions does not arise under the Constitution
or laws of the United States: It derives from common law tort principles.
The Federal Government, however, has prescribed procedures by which
such suits may be brought against it. The statutes relating to the FTCA set
out procedural limits and provide for a federal forum. Thus, while an
FTCA action may be substantial because of its nonfrivolous nature, an
FTCA action is not substantially federal in character because no substantive
federal issue or law must be interpreted or given effect. 134 Claims relating to
specific aspects of the FTCA, however, such as whether a particular person
is an "employee of the government" 135 or whether a particular claim has
been fully exhausted in the relevant administrative agency, 136 are substan-
tially federal in character. Such claims arise under the laws of the United
States. Therefore, jurisdiction in such cases could be predicated on the fed-
eral question statute.
137
The FTCA does not involve any federal question by itself nor does the
statute contain any in personam requirements. Nevertheless, FTCA cases
are like diversity cases because the plaintiff presents no substantial question
of federal law. Moreover, they are akin to federal question cases since the
right of legal action arises under a law of the United States. Therefore, the
FTCA is a hybrid jurisdictional statute which requires its own rule of pen-
dent jurisdiction.
2 Sovereign Immunity
The United States is immune from suit unless it consents to be sued.
138
The FTCA is a waiver of sovereign immunity.1 39 As such, the statute must
dictional statute will control. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). Thus, the Gibbs type
constitutional issues predominate only when there is a substantial federal question and when
Congress sets no supplementary in rem or in personam limits on jurisdiction.
134. See infra note 228; see also infra note 139 (the FICA expressly provides that "the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred" shall control whether a cause of action
exists).
135. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982).
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1982).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982); see infra note 146.
138. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); see also Williams v. United
States, 289 U.S. 553, 576 (1933), rev'd, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (expressing Hamilton's view that
"[i]t is inherent in the nature of the sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent.") (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 455 (A. Hamilton) (Kramnick ed.
1987) (emphasis in original)).
139. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1982); see Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.
315, 319 (1955) (holding that the FTCA is a waiver of sovereign immunity). Section 1346(b)
provides, in part:
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be construed narrowly."4 The FTCA provides that the United States Gov-
ernment will be liable for the negligence of its employees acting within the
scope of their employment.14 From the plain language of the statute, it is
clear that the government has statutorily consented to suit as if it were a
private employer.'
42
B. The FTCA's Jurisdictional Scope
Despite the Supreme Court's limitation of pendent party jurisdiction in
Aldinger v. Howard,'43 the Aldinger Court remarked in dictum that when
jurisdiction is exclusive, as it is under the FTCA, "the argument of judicial
economy and convenience can be coupled with the additional argument that
only in a federal court may all of the claims be tried together."'" Although
this statement unquestionably supports the joinder of private pendent parties
under the FTCA, the Court in Aldinger was reluctant to "lay down any
sweeping pronouncement upon the existence or exercise of such jurisdic-
tion."' 45 The Court's remark, therefore, never became law.
[T]he district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omis-
sion occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
140. Sherwood 312 U.S. at 590 (holding that waivers of sovereign immunity must be
strictly construed). But see 3A J. MOORE, J. LucAs, & G. GROTHEER, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE, 20.07(3), at 20-58 (2d ed. 1987) (arguing that Sherwood's rule of strict construc-
tion is unsound and outdated because liberal construction best serves the purpose of the stat-
ute). Other commentators have rejected Sherwood's hardline position against the joinder of
any private parties, even those who fall under other federal jurisdictional statutes, in suits
against the government. See WRIGTrr, supra note 77, § 1658, at 415 (citing Baumgold Bros.,
Inc. v. Allan M. Fox Co., 336 F. Supp 175, 178 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (rejecting the Sherwood anti-
joinder principle where the plaintiff asserted a Tucker Act claim for lost diamonds insured by
the Postal Service and a claim against a diverse defendant who had received the package)).
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); see supra note 139.
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); see Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955)
(holding that the purpose of the FTCA is to compensate victims of negligence of governmental
activities in circumstances like those in which a private person would be liable); see also 28
U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
143. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).




To assess the FTCA's jurisdictional scope, a court must first look to the
statute's language. 46 The FTCA uses the term "civil actions" in its generic
sense.' 47 "Civil action" has a broad meaning which includes the concept of
"case" and the outdated concept of "cause of action."' 48 The term "against
the United States," on the other hand, suggests that the statute only applies
to actions against the United States and no one else.' 49 The apparent dis-
crepancy between the statute's rather broad and very specific language is a
matter for judicial interpretation. Thus, it is not entirely unclear whether
the FTCA makes special in personam requirements.' 5 °
A second method of determining whether the statute encompasses pen-
dent parties is to examine its legislative history. The FTCA's legislative his-
tory indicates that the legislature's original intent may have been to exclude
all private parties from FTCA actions, including those who satisfy some
other federal jurisdictional requirements.'' The Supreme Court, however,
has rejected this line of thinking.'52
Third, common legal practices may help to define the statute's meaning.
At common law, a plaintiff may join joint tortfeasors, holding them jointly
and severally liable for a single wrong.'" 3 The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure encourage the joinder of all parties defendant if the right to relief arises
out of the same transaction or occurrence. 114 When the FTCA was enacted,
146. "IT]he district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages,..." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) (emphasis
added).
147. "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.'" FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
148. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 722-24 (1966); see also Freer, supra
note 2 at 56-58.
149. See Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2008 (1989); see also infra notes 197-202
and accompanying text.
150. The issue is whether the FTCA is party-specific. The diversity statute specifies that
only parties of diverse citizenship meeting the amount in controversy requirement may sue
under the statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), supra note 94. The general federal question
statute, however, is not party-specific. This statute makes no reference to parties: "The dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
151. In an early version of the FTCA, the House of Representatives stated that, "[t]he bill
therefore does not permit any person to be joined as a defendant with the United States and
does not lift the immunity of the United States from tort actions except as jurisdiction is specif-
ically conferred upon the district courts by this bill." H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess., 5 (1945) (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941)).
152. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 551-52 n.8 (1951) (wherein the
Supreme Court allowed Yellow Cab, which was being sued for injuries sustained in a collision
with a postal truck, to implead the United States for contribution under the FTCA).
153. Joinder is permitted where the combined acts of two defendants under a common
duty produce a single result. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 47 (5th ed. 1984).
154. The rule provides that:
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it expressly recognized the applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to tort claims against the government.' Although this provision of
the FTCA is no longer in force, Congress has established that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure apply in all federal civil actions. 156 Therefore, if
the United States is an alleged joint tortfeasor, it could, under the Federal
Rules, be joined as a codefendant. The various circuit courts of appeal, how-
ever, have not universally accepted this result.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has consistently
held that the United States is the only proper party in a civil action pursuant
to FTCA jurisdiction. 157  In Ayala v. United States,158 over one hundred
actions were filed against the United States for damages arising from the
explosion of a bomb-laden boxcar under a Navy haulage contract.' 59 The
plaintiffs sought to sue the government and the boxcar manufacturer.'
6
0
The district court denied the joinder of the manufacturer, a private party, on
grounds that the Ninth Circuit did not recognize pendent party jurisdic-
tion. 161 The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the manufacturer,
holding that pendent party jurisdiction is not a viable form of federal juris-
diction. 162 The court based its decision on Ninth Circuit precedent 163 disal-
lowing pendent parties. Although the Ninth Circuit's view is that pendent
party jurisdiction is not permissible, the Ninth Circuit cases agree that pro-
vided an independent ground of federal jurisdiction over a third party de-
fendant exists, that party may be joined.6 The theory is that, because there
All persons... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against
them jointly, [or] severally, . . . any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
Rule 82 states, however, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not bestow subject
matter jurisdiction over parties joined pursuant to the rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
155. See United States v. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. at 553 n.9 (1951).
156. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-72 (1982).
157. See infra note 163.
158. 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
159. Id. at 1197.
160. Id.
161. See id. (mentioning that the circuit has rejected pendent party jurisdiction altogether).
162. Id. at 1200.
163. Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Moor v.
Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969); Wil-
liams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1969).
164. Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d at 954 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally JAYSON, 1
HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 177 (1989). The Ninth Circuit, in Benbow v. Wolf, 217
F.2d 203, 205 n.3 (9th Cir. 1954), stated that United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543
(1951), reversed the opinion expressed in Uarte v. United States, 7 F.R.D. 705, 707 (S.D. Cal.
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exists independent federal jurisdiction, such as diversity or federal question
jurisdiction, over the additional party, the plaintiff could have brought the
action against the additional party despite any limitations of the anchor ju-
risdiction. Thus, the plaintiff merely consolidates the actions as opposed to
joining a new party over whom there is no federal jurisdiction.
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit view, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, in Stewart v. United States,165 found that, because the
FTCA bestows jurisdiction exclusively on the district courts, the plaintiff has
no choice but to initiate the entire case in federal court. 16 6 In Stewart, an
employee of a company hired by the government to manage a nuclear weap-
ons facility brought suit in tort against the United States, his employer
Rockwell International, and a coemployee for injuries incurred in an acci-
dent at the facility's parking lot. 167 The court addressed the issue of whether
there was proper subject matter jurisdiction as to the nondiverse coem-
ployee. The court held that, under Gibbs, pendent jurisdiction existed.
161
Moreover, the court also found no "congressional disapproval of the exercise
of... pendent party jurisdiction in the FTCA. ' , 169
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit echoed the
Stewart court's position in Lykins v. Pointer, Inc. 170 In Lykins, the court
held that there is "no express or implied negation of the federal courts'
power to hear pendent party claims when [the FTCA] is invoked to confer
jurisdiction on the district court."' 17 ' Thus, both the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits allow the use of pendent party jurisdiction to join additional parties
in FTCA litigation.
Without any clear legislative intent to include or exclude pendent parties,
federal courts had to rely on the FTCA's language in determining which
parties may sue and be sued under the statute. Because the federal judiciary
was unable to reach a consensus on the breadth of the statute, the Supreme
Court resolved the issue in Finley v. United States 1
72
1948) that the FTCA "contemplates that the government shall be the sole defendant" (empha-
sis in original).
165. 716 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
166. Id. at 758.
167. Id. at 757.
168. Id at 757-58.
169. Id at 758; see Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2010-11 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
170. 725 F.2d 645 (11th Cir. 1984).
171. Id at 647. For a discussion of jurisdictional exclusion see notes 79-86 and accompa-
nying text.
172. 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
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III. FINLEY V. UNITED STATES
On November 11, 1983, Barbara Finley, a resident of California, lost her
husband and two children when their twin engine plane struck city power
lines and crashed at a San Diego airfield." Finley brought a tort action in
California state court against the San Diego Gas & Electric Company for
negligently positioning and illuminating the power lines at the airport. She
also sued the city of San Diego, claiming that negligent maintenance left the
airport's runway lights inoperative. 74 Subsequently, Finley brought a simi-
lar action against the United States, alleging that the FAA had negligently
maintained the runway lights and negligently carried out its duties as air
traffic controller. 175 Pursuant to the jurisdictional grant under the
FTCA, 176 Finley brought her action against the FAA in United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of California.
17 7
Approximately one year later, Finley moved to amend her federal com-
plaint to join the San Diego Gas & Electric Company and the city of San
Diego.'T7 Hence, the issue arose as to whether a plaintiff suing the United
States under the FTCA could join additional defendants over whom there is
no independent basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Contrary to the
controlling Ninth Circuit holdings on this issue, 179 the district court found
that the plaintiff could join the nonfederal parties under the theory of pen-
dent party jurisdiction.' 80 Relying on a footnote in a Ninth Circuit deci-
sion" 1 for legal support, the district court reasoned that "judicial economy
and efficiency" warranted trying all the actions together.18 2 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit summarily reversed the dis-
trict court's decision.1 83 The court of appeals found that the district court
improperly permitted the joinder of nonfederal parties in light of Ayala's
plain prohibition against the joinder of nonfederal parties in FTCA ac-
173. Id. at 2005.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); see supra note 139.
177. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2005.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
180. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2005; see Petition for Certiorari, supra note 24, Appendix A at A-
9.
181. Mattschei v. United States, 600 F.2d 205, 207 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) (Judge Kennedy
questioned the dismissal of a pendent action in an FTCA case); see Petition for Certiorari,
supra note 24, Appendix A at A-8.
182. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 24, at A-8.
183. Id. at A-2; see also Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2005.
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tions.'8 4 The plaintiff petitioned to the United States Supreme Court and the
Court granted certiorari.185
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision, choosing to
construe the FTCA's jurisdictional grant narrowly.'
8 6  The majority' 87
found that the FTCA's jurisdictional grant did not reach the nonfederal de-
fendants.188 Specifically, the Court determined that, under the jurisdictional
grant of the FTCA, a plaintiff may bring an action only against the United
States. 8 9 Thus, the Court resolved the split among the federal circuit courts
of appeal' 90 as to whether the FTCA permits the joinder of nonfederal
defendants.
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, found that the Court's decision was mis-
guided because there was no clear congressional intent to ban nonfederal
parties under the FTCA. 9' In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens disagreed
with the majority, asserting that the FTCA extends jurisdiction to "civil ac-
tions" against the United States.'92 Justice Stevens urged that in light of the
term's use in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the statute requires
courts to read the term "civil action" broadly.' 93 Furthermore, the dissent-
ers contended that, because plaintiffs who sue pursuant to the FTCA are in
the awkward posture of being required to bring their suit in federal court,
they should be able to litigate their entire case there.'94 A plaintiff such as
Finley, who is not diverse with the state parties and does not sue them pur-
suant to any federal law, is automatically precluded from getting complete
relief in one judicial proceeding.
184. Petition for Certioriari, supra note 24, at A-I to A-2.
185. Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988).
186. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2007, 2010.
187. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor,
and Kennedy.
188. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008, 2010.
189. Id. at 2008.
190. Compare Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435
U.S. 982 (1978) (pendent party jurisdiction not permitted under the FTCA) with Lykins v.
Pointer, Inc., 725 F.2d 645 (11th Cir. 1984) (pendent party jurisdiction permitted under
FTCA), Stewart v. United States, 716 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1018 (1984) and Dick Meyers Towing Service, Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1024 n.1
(5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). See supra notes 157-71
and accompanying text.
191. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2011 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
192. Id. at 2021 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall. Id.
193. Id. at 2019 n.25.
194. All four dissenting Justices agreed that exclusivity of jurisdiction was a compelling
reason to allow the joinder of nonfederal parties. Id. at 2011, 2021.
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The dissenters relied on dictum in Aldinger, which hinted that the
FTCA's jurisdictional exclusivity supports the joinder of nonfederal parties
who meet the Gibbs test.' 95 The dissent's reliance on Aldinger was ironic
because the majority in Finley relied on the same case to deny Finley's mo-
tion for joining state and federal parties.
A. The Court's Interpretation of the FTCA's Jurisdictional Grant
In Finley, the Supreme Court held that the FTCA's jurisdictional grant
does not allow a plaintiff to join a nonfederal party in a suit against the
United States even though the state action and the federal action arise out of
a common nucleus of operative fact. The Court wrote that "[]ust as the
statutory provision 'between... citizens of different States' has been held to
mean citizens of different States and no one else .... so also here we con-
clude that 'against the United States' means against the United States and no
one else."' 96 To emphasize this, the majority reiterated, "the statute here
defines jurisdiction in a manner that does not reach defendants other than
the United States.' 197 To support its point, the Court relied on United
States v. Sherwood, 9 which interpreted the same statutory language in the
Tucker Act,' 99 a federal statute with similarly limited jurisdictional parame-
ters. Sherwood held that private parties were not within the reach of the
Tucker Act's jurisdictional grant.2"°
The Court's declaration that "'against the United States' means against
the United States and no one else" did not mean that private parties may not
be joined as defendants when the government is sued pursuant to the
FTCA.20 Throughout the Finley opinion, the Court rejected the notion
that parties that fall under independent sources of federal jurisdiction should
195. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976); see supra text accompanying note 144.
196. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008 (footnote omitted) (citing Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978)).
197. Id. at 2009 (footnote omitted).
198. 312 U.S. 584 (1941) (holding that in suits brought pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), no private parties may be joined with the United States); see supra notes
121-25 and accompanying text.
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction,
concurrent with the United States Claims Court, of... [a]ny... civil action or claim against
the United States not exceeding $10,000 .... " (emphasis added).
200. The Court held that: "[The court's] jurisdiction is confined to the rendition of money
judgments in suits brought for that relief against the United States, and if the relief sought is
against others than the United States the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the juris-
diction of the court." Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588 (citations omitted).
201. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008-10; see also Brief for Respondent at 17, Finley v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (No. 87-1973) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
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be excluded from joinder with the government in FTCA actions.20 2 Accord-
ingly, the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's view20 3 and held that the
FTCA cannot supply jurisdiction over defendants other than the United
States.
The Court reasoned that the pendent jurisdiction supplied by the underly-
ing anchor claim was necessarily the same jurisdiction that would supple-
ment any nonfederal actions. 2" The additional parties could not be
appended to the anchor FTCA jurisdiction because the statute necessitated
that the only party defendant be the United States Government. 205 More-
over, there is no generic form of federal jurisdiction to which parties may be
appended.206 The Court emphasized that pendent jurisdiction is only as in-
clusive as the jurisdiction granted by the underlying jurisdictional statute, in
this case, the FTCA.2 °7 Thus, since the FTCA did not provide for any party
defendant other than the United States, pendent parties did not fall under its
jurisdiction.
Just as in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,2"8 the jurisdiction
invoked to support the main case is the very jurisdiction that extends to a
pendent party or claim.2 °9 In Owen, ancillary jurisdiction supported the
presence of Owen Equipment & Erection Co. This jurisdiction necessarily
disappeared when the ancillarity disappeared. The ancillary jurisdiction ex-
isted between the defendant Owen and the impleaded defendant, OPPD.
Thus, that ancillarity ceased once OPPD was dismissed from the suit. The
vital jurisdictional link of diversity between Kroger and Owen no longer ex-
isted. From an understanding of this principle, the Court in Finley ruled
that, in FTCA cases, pendent jurisdiction could not supplement any lacking
federal jurisdiction.210
202. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008; see id. at 2006-10. If the Court is trying to use Sherwood to
justify its holding that" 'against the United States' means against the United States and no one
else," then it cannot consistently rely on Sherwood and say that private parties are permissible
in section 1346 litigation insofar as they possess independent jurisdiction. See id.
203. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's view see supra notes 158-64 and accompanying
text.
204. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2007-09.
205. Id. at 2008-10.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 70-76.
207. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2009.
208. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
209. See supra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
210. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2007-08.
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B. Justice Blackmun's Dissent. The "Sensible Result"
Justice Blackmun, dissenting from the majority's opinion, questioned the
Court's reading of Aldinger v. Howard.2 1' Specifically, Justice Blackmun
criticized the Court's attempt to find congressional intent to exclude pendent
parties by relying on the absence of any mention of pendent parties within
the statute. The Justice argued that since pendent parties, by definition, are
not mentioned in jurisdictional statutes, they could never be expressly or
impliedly excluded212 in a jurisdictional statute.2"3
Finding no congressional intent in the FTCA exempting private par-
ties,214 Justice Blackmun argued that since the FTCA confers exclusive ju-
risdiction on the federal courts,215 the "sensible result is to permit the
exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction." '216
C. Justice Stevens' Dissent: The "Federal Question"
Justice Stevens argued that the majority's opinion in Finley was contrary
to the well-reasoned opinions of many federal judges.217 Furthermore, Jus-
tice Stevens asserted that the majority mistakenly applied the standards of
the diversity statute to interpret the FTCA, and failed to acknowledge the
true meaning of the term "civil action., 21 8 Additionally, Justice Stevens ar-
gued that even if the Court were not to find that Finley's actions amounted
211. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). Justice Blackmun analogized his disagreement in Finley with Jus-
tice Brennan's dissent in Aldinger. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2010.
212. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2011 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). If parties cannot be expressly
excluded, they cannot, logically, be impliedly excluded.
213. In Aldinger, Justice Brennan wrote:
The test the Court announces is "whether by virtue of the statutory grant of subject-
matter jurisdiction, upon which petitioner's principal claim... rests, Congress has
addressed itself to the party as to whom jurisdiction pendent to the principal claim is
sought." At one level of analysis, this test is of course meaningless, being capable of
application to all cases, because all instances of asserted pendent-party jurisdiction
will by definition involve a party as to whom Congress has impliedly "addressed
itself" by not expressly conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts.
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
214. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2010-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra note 169 and accom-
panying text. But see supra note 151 and accompanying text (legislative history suggesting
that private parties are not to be joined in FTCA actions).
215. Justice Blackmun relied on Justice Rehnquist's dictum in Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18; see
supra text accompanying note 144.
216. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2011 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217. Justice Stevens relied on the reasoning of Justice Cardozo and Judge Friendly to sup-
port his contention that pendent parties should be allowed in the Finley case. See Finley, 109
S. Ct. at 2015-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see infra notes 224-25 (Friendly, J.), and note 277
(Cardozo, J.) and accompanying text.
218. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2018-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to a constitutional case, two alternative rationales supported the joinder of
state parties in Finley's federal suit.2 19
First, Justice Stevens noted that article III of the United States Constitu-
tion provides that the federal courts shall have jurisdiction over
"[c]ontroversies to which the United States shall be a party."22 Second,
Justice Stevens pointed out that the FTCA expressly grants jurisdiction for
tort claims against the United States.
221
According to Justice Stevens, a third alternative source of jurisdiction for
the Finley claim existed. Namely, Justice Stevens stated that an application
of the "arising under" provision of the Constitution, which makes no in per-
sonam requirements, would avoid extending the FTCA's subject matter ju-
risdiction.222 Justice Stevens' alternative argument, however, is weakened
by the fact that the "law" under which the case arises, the FTCA itself,
contains a superseding grant of special federal jurisdiction. Even if Finley
had argued that her case arose under the laws of the United States, the
FTCA does not constitute a substantial federal claim and is thus inadequate
for meeting the "arising under" requirements.
221
Relying on two prior Second Circuit decisions, 224 Justice Stevens found
exclusivity of jurisdiction to be a compelling reason to allow pendent parties.
Justice Stevens also highlighted the judiciary's discretion in matters of sup-
plemental jurisdiction.225 To support his argument that there is constitu-
tional power to hear the case, Justice Stevens cited a First Circuit decision
226
that supported the notion that cases brought pursuant to the FTCA are, in
the words of the Constitution, "[c]ontroversies to which the United States
[is] a [p]arty." This First Circuit decision, however, contradicts Justice Ste-
219. Id. at 2012-13 (relying on the notion that a federal court cannot deny jurisdiction in a
case to which jurisdiction has been extended by the Constitution). But see Finley, 109 S. Ct. at
2008 (stating that the court has never reached the result that jurisdiction will lie based on
Gibbs' constitutional test alone).
220. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2012-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2;
supra note 2.
221. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2013 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
222. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2013 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text; see also infra note 228.
224. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly,
J.) (exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, (admiralty)); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698
F.2d 61, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983) (Friendly, J.,) (exclusive juris-
diction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
225. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2014-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United Mine Work-
ers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)); see also, e.g., Leather's Best, 451 F.2d at 811 n. 14 (judicial
discretion exercised to allow pendent parties); Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951 (9th
Cir. 1969) (judicial discretion exercised not to allow pendent parties in FTCA action).
226. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2017 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Ortiz v. United States
Government, 595 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1979)).
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vens' assertion that FTCA actions are "[c]ase[s] .. .arising under ... the
laws of the United States."2 27 Justice Stevens advanced the theory that the
FTCA is, by virtue of being a federal law, a federal question and deserves the
appropriate jurisdictional treatment. Some federal courts and commentators
argue, however, that FTCA actions do not present a substantial question of
federal law.228
Although a dispute exists as to whether article III's use of "to which the
United States [is] a [p]arty" refers to the United States as a party plaintiff or
defendant,2 29 Justice Stevens argued that because the sovereign waived its
immunity in the FTCA, civil actions brought pursuant to that statute are
within the jurisdictional scope of article 111.230 To support this assertion,
Justice Stevens cited a prior Supreme Court decision 23' dismissing prece-
dent232 holding that the Founding Fathers deliberately omitted the word
"all" when they wrote "[c]ontroversies to which the United States shall be a
[p]arty." Justice Stevens argued that "controversies" means all controver-
sies.2 "3 Thus, when the government consents to be a "party" in a suit, the
Constitution provides that "party" means both plaintiff and defendant.
2 34
Justice Stevens' argument seems to rely on a principle that the Constitution
alone provides jurisdiction in civil actions against the government. 235 This
argument, however, is contrary to the principle that jurisdiction must be
both constitutionally and statutorily ordained.
2 36
227. Id. (footnote omitted); see also WRIGHT, supra note 77, § 3563, at 56 n.17 (1984)
(remarking that "[t]here is debate about whether suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act...
are federal question cases.").
228. See Mickelic v. United States Postal Service, 367 F. Supp. 1036, 1039-40 (W.D. Pa.
1973) (holding that the FTCA does not present a substantial federal question); see also infra
notes 241-47 and accompanying text. But see Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1201 n.8
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978) (rejecting the idea that "substantiality"
under Gibbs means that the anchor claim must turn on a significant matter of federal law and
holding that "substantial" merely means nonfrivolous). See Matasar, supra note 38, at 1420-
21 (asserting that "insubstantiality is virtually identical to a 'failure to state a claim.' "). No
matter how "substantial" or nonfrivolous a litigant's claim may be, however, it may still fail to
present a substantial federal question. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
229. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see infra text accompanying notes 255-57.
230. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2013.
231. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
232. Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 572-78 (1933).
233. Justice Stevens' reliance on Glidden seems to be weakened, however, by the fact that
Glidden recognized Williams' exception in situations where the sovereign has waived immu-
nity from suit. Glidden, 370 U.S. at 563-64.
234. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2012-13. Justice Stevens relied on this argument to support
the notion that the Constitution bestows an independent source of jurisdiction on FTCA cases.
No one suggests, however, that FTCA actions belong anywhere but in federal court. The issue
is whether pendent parties should follow.
235. See supra note 219.
236. See supra note 35.
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IV. FINLEY AND PENDENT PARTY JURISDICTION
A. Applicability of the Federal Question and Diversity Cases
The Court's holding in Finley that "against the United States" be con-
strued literally is uncharacteristic of the current attitude in FTCA jurispru-
dence. Only the Ninth Circuit has consistently denied pendent party
jurisdiction under the FTCA.2 37 Other circuits13 have read Aldinger less
narrowly and, therefore, have been more permissive of the joinder of pen-
dent parties. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Finley,2 39 contended that the
majority erred by reading the FTCA as if it were the diversity statute. Spe-
cifically, Justice Stevens alleged that the Court erred by relying on diversity
cases24" to interpret a federal question statute because diversity cases do not
present any "special federal interest."24 '
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,242 the Court held that in order for a
state claim to be pendent to a federal question claim, "[t]he federal claim
must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
court., 2 4 3 However, whether an FTCA claim is one which invokes substan-
tial federal law is debatable. 2" Although the FTCA confers federal jurisdic-
tion, the jurisdiction is specially granted. 24  Because the FTCA is merely a
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, granting jurisdiction in tort suits
against the government, it is not the substance of the tort claim which trig-
gers federal jurisdiction, rather it is the fact that the United States Govern-
ment has waived its immunity from suit and has specially provided for a
federal forum.24 6 Because diversity cases are no different from insubstantial
237. See, e.g., Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435
U.S. 982 (1978). See generally Brief for Petitioner at 12-26, Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
2003 (1989) (No. 87-1973) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief] (discussing the instances in which all
other circuits permit pendent parties). See also supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Lykins v. Pointer, 725 F.2d 645 (1 1th Cir. 1984). See generally Petitioner's
Brief, supra note 237 at 12-26. See also supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text'
239. Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2011-23 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. The majority relied on Zahn v. Int'l Paper.Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) and Owen Equip.
& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); see supra notes 92-117 and accompanying text.
241. Finley, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2022 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242. 383 U.S. 715 (1966); see supra text accompanying notes 43-65.
243. Id. at 725 (citing Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933)).
244. See supra notes 128-37, 228 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
246. For example, Finley sued under the common law theory of negligence. See Finley v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (1989). Additionally, the lack of a substantial federal
question is supported by the fact that the government has consented to suit as though it were a
private person. Common law tort suits against private persons involve no federal question.
See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
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federal question cases in that both involve state law in a federal forum,2 47 the
diversity cases may be dispositive of FTCA jurisdiction cases like Finley.
Thus, Justice Stevens' argument that the diversity cases are faulty indicators
of how pendent parties should be treated under the FTCA seems incor-
rect.248 Justice Stevens is correct, however, in noting that the diversity case
law on pendent parties is not entirely analogous in the FTCA context. Un-
like the diversity statute, the FTCA statute does not make express in per-
sonam or amount in controversy requirements.249 Instead, the FTCA raises
the issue of how pendent parties should be treated in an exclusive forum and
when the anchor jurisdiction is a waiver of sovereign immunity. Therefore,
neither the federal question nor diversity cases are dispositive of whether
pendent parties are permissible under the FTCA.
. Jurisdictional Exclusivity
The dissenting justices found that the FTCA's exclusivity provision was a
compelling reason to allow the joinder of state parties. Exclusivity of juris-
diction is not a persuasive reason to permit pendent parties under the FTCA,
however, because exclusivity only goes to the forum itself, not to the parties.
The dispute in Finley is over pendent parties. Thus, if the Supreme Court
had found that Finley could have joined state parties in her federal action,
the Court would not have allowed the joinder on the basis of exclusivity.
Instead, the Court would have found that, under Aldinger, the FTCA does
not expressly or impliedly exempt private parties.
The Finley Court did nothing more than apply the Aldinger standard.25°
In Finley, the Court looked at the FTCA's jurisdictional statute and deter-
mined that parties other than the United States were not covered. There-
fore, pendent jurisdiction was not a means of joining private parties in a tort
action against the United States. For additional parties to be joined, they
must fall under an independent jurisdictional statute.251
Some might argue, however, that because the Court does not allow pen-
dent parties in FTCA actions where there is exclusive federal jurisdiction,
there is no reason to expect the Court to allow pendent parties in the less
247. Justice Stevens, relying on the fact that diversity cases are not based on a federal
question, ignored the fact that the FTCA is not a substantial federal question. Instead, the
Justice should have distinguished the diversity cases on the basis of their in personam focus.
248. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2018-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249. See supra notes 94 (diversity) and 139 (FTCA); see also Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2019
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (remarking that the Court mistakenly "treats the absence of an affirm-
ative grant of jurisdiction" as though it implicitly excluded pendent parties).
250. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
251. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. 2003; Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
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compelling diversity or federal question actions where federal jurisdiction is
not exclusive. Therefore, federal courts ought not to focus on the exclusivity
of the forum, but on the substantiality of the claim.252
Jurisdictional exclusivity does not persuade the Finley Court to permit
pendent parties in FTCA litigation. Moreover, Finley would have lost her
case even if the Court accepted the Aldinger dictum favoring the joinder of
state parties because Finley focuses on the language "against the United
States," interpreting it to mean against the United States and no one else.253
Exclusivity is not the issue.
C. Determining Which Language Controls
The Finley Court held that since the FTCA's jurisdictional grant only
covers suits against the United States and can only extend its own variety of
jurisdiction to pendent parties, private parties are excluded from the FTCA's
grant.254 Contrary to Justice Stevens' reasoning, the Court did not find that
the constitutional provision extending federal jurisdiction to "[c]ontroversies
to which the United States shall be a [p]arty" grants federal jurisdiction over
all civil actions brought pursuant to the FTCA.25 In Gibbs, however, the
Court stated that "cases" and "controversies" may encompass state ac-
tions.256 Thus, under this broad reading it appears that a "[c]ontroversy to
which the United States [is] a Party" may include state actions.2 7 Because
of these diverging views, it is not clear which term is controlling: "contro-
versy" or "to which the United States shall be a [p]arty."
Justice Stevens asserted that Finley should be able to join her state parties
in her federal action because of the substantial factual overlap in the cases.
Applying the Gibbs standard, Justice Stevens found that Finley's state and
federal actions amounted to one constitutional case. Justice Stevens relied
on the judicial reasoning of a Second Circuit decision2 1 that determined
that since the merger of the rules of procedure for admiralty and other civil
actions in 1966, "the constitutional rationale which underlies the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction ... may be applied to support the conclusion that a
federal court has the power to hear a related state claim."'259 Furthermore,
252. See supra notes 128-37, 228 and accompanying text.
253. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008; see supra text accompanying notes 196-201.
254. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008.
255. The majority in Finley did not address this precise point. Instead, the majority fo-
cused on the statutory inadequacies facing pendent parties. Iai at 2005-10.
256. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2,
supra note 2, on "civil action" and "cases" and "controversies."
257. See supra notes 226-36 and accompanying text.
258. Leather's Best, Inc. v. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 810 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J.).
259. Id. at 810-11.
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because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all federal civil ac-
tions,2" the use of the term "civil action" as used in the FTCA and in the
rules should be read identically. Justice Stevens endorsed the notion that the
term "civil action" is coextensive with constitutional "case."
261
In Finley, the majority refused to interpret the FTCA to give "civil ac-
tion" more weight than "against the United States." If Finley is any indica-
tion of how the Court understands article III, the Court again may find that
when Congress has extended jurisdiction to cases in which the United States
is a defendant,2 62 the jurisdiction does not extend to pendent parties. A re-
view of other statutes may be helpful in clarifying the intent of the FTCA.
1. Actions Commenced by the United States
Under section 1345 of the Judicial Code, Congress has granted federal
jurisdiction over all cases brought by the United States Government.263
Pendent jurisdiction is a plaintiff's device.264 Therefore, analyzing whether
federal jurisdiction extends to pendent party defendants when the United
States initiates a civil action pursuant to section 1345 is of little help because
this section automatically creates federal jurisdiction over all of the govern-
ment's defendants.265
Whether section 1345 extends jurisdiction to third parties impleaded by a
section 1345 defendant, however, is unclear. Finley suggests that section
1345 would not reach so far as to allow nonfederal parties, because the stat-
ute only applies to civil actions "commenced by the United States." Read
narrowly, this language does not reach any defendants not expressly named
in the government's complaint. Nevertheless, the fact that Congress has
provided for a federal forum whenever the United States is sued or brings a
civil action is indirect support for the argument that any case involving the
United States belongs in federal court.266 One federal district court has held
that "[n]othing in the plain language of this statute suggests an intent by
260. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-72 (1982); see supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
261. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2019 n.25 (citing Freer, supra note 2, at 56-58).
262. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982).
263. "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by
any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1345 (1982).
264. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
265. See WRIGHT, supra note 77, § 3651 at 151 ("No subject matter jurisdiction difficulties
are presented when the United States is the plaintiff in an action in the federal courts.") (foot-
note omitted).
266. Moreover, the Constitution extends federal jurisdiction when the United States is a
party. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see supra note 2; see also supra notes 229-36 and accompany-
ing text.
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Congress to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction over parties appending their
claims to actions brought by an agency of the United States. ' 267 Moreover,
since the government can implead third parties when it is a defendant, 268 the
defendants of the government should be able to do the same.
2. Removal Jurisdiction
The question of pendent parties also arises under the removal statute, sec-
tion 1441 of the U.S. Code.269 Federal removal jurisdiction arises when a
federal defendant removes the case against him from a state to a federal
forum. Once the federal defendant removes pursuant to section 1441, the
district judge must decide whether to remand any remaining state actions.270
The issue of pendent parties is present in a situation where a plaintiff, suing
both state and federal parties, brings the entire case in state court to get
complete relief by avoiding the dismissal of a pendent party on the federal
level. If the defendant removes and the state actions are remanded, the re-
sult will be duplicative litigation. The existence of the judge's power to re-
mand state actions confirms the fact that nonfederal actions are only heard
at the judge's discretion and according to applicable standards.27'
267. Cumberland V.H.A. v. Inhabitants of the Town of Cumberland, 609 F. Supp. 1481,
1486 (D. Me. 1985).
268. United States v. Illinois, 454 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918
(1972).
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982).
270. The statute provides that:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be re-
movable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more non-removable claims or
causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may deter-
mine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982).
271. See Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (pendent party jurisdiction not
permitted under the FTCA); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978)
(ancillary party jurisdiction denied between nondiverse parties in a diversity suit); Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (pendent party jurisdiction denied in a civil rights action against a
party not deemed to be a "person" under the statute which only provides for actions against
persons); Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (pendent party jurisdiction found not to
exist between diversity class action plaintiffs who lacked a claim for less than the requisite
$ 10,000); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (pendent jurisdiction will exist,
at the court's discretion, when the anchor claim is based on a substantial federal issue and the
state and federal actions derive from a common nucleus of operative fact); see also Charles D.
Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. McCarthy, 708 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.) (federal court lacked pendent
party jurisdiction because the removal statute does not provide a basis for jurisdiction which
would otherwise be lacking), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983). But see Aragona v. Guzman
Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1377 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding "that [28 U.S.C.]
§ 1441(d), when invoked by a 'foreign state' defendant, should operate to remove the entire
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Under the standards articulated in Aldinger, federal courts are required to
look at the applicable jurisdictional statute when determining whether to
admit pendent parties.272 Additionally, the removal statute neither ex-
pressly nor impliedly precludes a federal court from hearing state actions.27 3
Even though federal courts have varying attitudes toward pendent jurisdic-
tion, they all must follow the Aldinger rule. Thus, the Finley Court applied
Aldinger's axiom.274
D. Reading the FTCA as a Whole
A principal defect in the majority's reasoning in Finley is the unwilling-
ness to read the FTCA as a whole. The FTCA states that the government
should be held liable as if it were a "private person., 275 The United States
has waived its sovereign immunity to the extent that its liability equals that
of any private person under similar circumstances. Therefore, "against the
United States" should be understood as against the United States as if it were
a private person.27 6 Because private persons can be joined as joint
tortfeasors, so should the United States be joined when it reduces itself to the
level of a private person. As Justice Cardozo said, "No sensible reason can
be imagined why the state, having consented to be sued, should thus para-
lyze the remedy.,
2 77
Although Finley is an application of the Aldinger rule, the Finley Court
chose not to read "civil action" broadly. Instead, it held that "against the
United States" was the operative language barring pendent parties. The next
jurisdictional cases before the Supreme Court should require a construction
of "civil action." One commentator suggests that civil action is as inclusive
as "case" 278 in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.279 The Court may accept this
action pending in state court against all defendants, private and domestic, as well as the foreign
sovereign"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995 (1985).
272. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. at 16-17; see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
273. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) ("the district court may determine all issues therein"). Sec-
tion 1441(d) provides for removal jurisdiction in a civil action brought against a foreign state.
One court interpreted the term "civil action" to encompass all the parties, state and federal.
Aragona, 621 F.2d 1371, 1377 n.7 (1980).
274. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2007, 2010.
275. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
276. The statute could also be amended to exclude pendent parties. Congress could pro-
vide that "against the United States" entails the notion that any jurisdictionally insufficient
private party is not appendable to a claim under the FTCA. Note that the Court remarked
that Congress may, at any time, reverse the Court's ruling and provide for the joinder of
pendent parties such as Finley. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2010.
277. Anderson v. Hayes Construction, 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29, remittitur de-
nied, 243 N.Y. 593, 154 N.E. 619 (1926).
278. See Freer, supra note 2, at 58.
279. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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interpretation. The Court also may rule, however, that the terms "case" and
"civil action" are to be qualified by the contextual language of the Constitu-
tion or the particular statute. Thus, although "case" and "civil action" are
broadly defined in some instances, the terms can take on a narrower meaning
in accordance with the particular jurisdictional language. Therefore, as Fin-
ley teaches, the federal courts can construe "civil action" in special jurisdic-
tional statutes such as the FTCA in a manner inconsistent with the broad
concept of constitutional case.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Finley v. United States further limits the doctrine of pendent
party jurisdiction, the decision has not eliminated the doctrine under the
federal question statute. Furthermore, Finley has not destroyed the doctrine
under the various non-FTCA special jurisdictional statutes. Finley merely
applies the rule that courts look to both the constitutional and statutory
validity of a nonfederal party before extending jurisdiction over that party.
Thus, Finley is not determinative of whether pendent party jurisdiction is
dead or alive. Finley, as an application of Aldinger, only speaks to jurisdic-
tion under the FTCA. Nevertheless, there is a discernible trend away from
the joinder of pendent parties. Finley is part of that trend. As the split
among the justices and the circuit courts indicates, the exclusion of pendent
parties is not a widely favored practice. Therefore, in the instances where
the more liberal circuits can distinguish Finley on its facts, pendent party
jurisdiction may still be a viable jurisdictional avenue.
Warwick M Carter, Jr.
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